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Abstract 
Offshore wind megaprojects in European waters have significant carbon abatement potential and 
increasing their number is a policy goal for several European maritime nations. But experience has 
shown that governance of large-scale, commercial offshore wind development is not straight-
forward.  It is found that in five EU Member States, policy innovation intended to enable investment 
in offshore wind projects is leading to a convergence upon a distinctive European model of offshore 
wind governance. Notably, the European Union appears to play a relatively small role in this process 
and further research into how offshore wind policy innovation propagates in the EU is warranted. 
Policy relevance 
The governance of offshore wind megaproject development places specific demands on several 
areas of policy.  This article contributes to meeting those demands in several ways. Firstly, it provides 
an account of recent developments in how offshore wind governance functions in some of the most 
important offshore wind nations. Secondly, the observation of the EU’s limited role in shaping 
offshore wind governance will inform future debates about the proper role of the EU in enabling 
offshore wind investment. Thirdly, the fact that policy appears to be converging raises questions 
about how policy is transmitted between EU Member States, the answers to which could be valuable 
to policymakers looking at other areas of energy governance. Finally, the observed trend of 
increasing centralisation of decision making should be of interest to policymakers mindful of the role 
of scale and decentralisation in debates about energy governance. 
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An offshore wind union? Diversity and convergence in European offshore wind governance. 
It is widely accepted that renewable energy technologies have an important role to play in 
decarbonising the energy sector and tackling climate change (IPCC, 2014; Mitchell et al., 2011; IEA, 
2015a). In several European countries, the pursuit of the Continent’s offshore wind resource is a 
stated policy goal, not least due to the apparently wide-open spaces of the sea and the mitigation of 
some of the problems of acceptance generated  by onshore wind (Twidell & Gaudiosi, 2009; 
Ladenburg & Dubgaard, 2007).  
But, in the same way that Henry Ford’s customers could have a car in any colour (as long as it was 
black), offshore wind projects only come in one size: extra-large.  A sector able to deliver the offshore 
wind megaprojects1 that have become the norm in Europe (EWEA, 2015; Anzinger & Kostka, 2015) 
does not happen by accident. In addition to the very substantial engineering challenge of building the 
largest rotating machines ever seen (Beurskens, 2011) – at sea, demonstrating compliance with 
relevant social and environmental requirements of regulation and law, connecting the plant to the 
electricity transmission system and ensuring sufficient revenue to raise finance are all vital but 
complex parts of the project development process. In all European countries with offshore wind 
ambitions, development and installation of offshore wind farms is carried out by companies within a 
framework of wide-ranging pre-existing and targeted legislation and regulations.  
The governance2 of offshore wind project development is distinct from that of other, land-based 
renewable energy technologies in two important ways. Firstly, the spatial planning implications of 
the marine environment impact on the legal nature, allocation and complexity of the rights and 
responsibilities of actors involved (Osherenko, 2007; Young, 2002). Secondly, nearly all elements of 
offshore wind construction are subject to greater risk and uncertainty that onshore renewables - in 
part due to the status of scientific evidence of impact and partly due to the relative immaturity of the 
technology (Leary & Esteban, 2009) – but also the sheer scale of projects and the capital committed 
to preparing a project for construction3.  
Since the first commercial offshore wind farm was installed in Denmark in 1992, the policy and 
regulatory frameworks that govern offshore wind development have evolved in all European 
offshore wind nations. Until recently approaches among European Member States were diverse with 
little or no commonality (Wieczorek et al., 2013). Explanations for this diversity could explore, inter 
alia, the industrial history that shaped the existing institutions, legislation and regulations4 (Toke et 
                                                          
1 Flyvberg (2014) provides a useful definition of mega project as “large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost US$1 
billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are 
transformational, and impact millions of people” 
2 Defined here as the policies and regulations that govern the interaction between offshore wind project developers and 
the various national, local and non-governmental bodies involved in establishing a large-scale, commercial offshore wind 
farm. 
3 Development expenses (DEVEX) 
4 Especially onshore renewables and offshore oil and gas 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
al., 2008) or political economic explanations such as varieties of capitalism (e.g. Hall & Soskice, 
2001b). This article explores the innovation in the governance of offshore wind development in 
Europe to determine whether or not it is leading to  convergence between Member States’ 
approaches over time and role of the European Union in that convergence.  
Innovation is defined here as distinct from policy invention and therefore includes approaches or 
ideas that are new to a particular Member State even if they have been implemented before 
elsewhere (Berry & Berry, 2007; Walker, 1969). 
Member State cases 
In order to explore the evolution of the governance of large-scale5, commercial offshore wind 
development over time, a comparative approach is taken. Five EU Member State cases are chosen 
which account for more than 95% of all operating capacity in the EU and in which some policy 
innovation to allow for future offshore wind construction has taken place, as well as the stated aim 
of increasing the national production of energy from large-scale, commercial offshore wind farms. 
The Member States chosen are Belgium, Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (UK). The table below shows the selection of cases and their offshore wind deployment 
status. 
 
Member State Wind farms Turbines MW 
Belgium 5 182 712 
Denmark 12 513 1271 
Germany 16 258 1048.9 
Netherlands 5 124 247 
United Kingdom 24 1301 4494.4 
Table 1: Offshore wind deployment status in five EU Member States at the end of 2014 (EWEA, 2015) 
  
                                                          
5 Defined here as 100MW capacity or greater 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Approach to analysis 
The analysis considers two main areas of offshore wind governance, marine resource management 
and economic governance.  
Developing an offshore wind farm has the potential to impact on society and the environment 
(Haggett, 2008; Portman et al., 2009; Bergström et al., 2014). The legislation and regulations that 
manage these impacts tend to be complex (Salter, 2008; Wright, 2014; Leary & Esteban, 2009) and 
the industrialisation of the oceans has led to a rethinking of marine governance (see Salcido, 2008; 
Wright, 2014; Osherenko, 2007). A central part of this marine governance is the management and 
regulation of marine resources such as marine renewable energy including the allocation of seabed 
tenure6 and the permitting process(es) by which development rights are issued. 
In addition to marine resource management, there are two areas of economic governance essential 
for the development of offshore wind farms. First is the question of ‘who does what’ when it comes 
to connecting a wind farm to the onshore electricity transmission system(Meeus et al., 2012; Meeus, 
2014). Second is the nature of the financial settlement available to the project owner. 
Together there are four constituent parts of offshore wind governance which are used as the basis of 
this comparison: 
 
1. The allocation of seabed tenure; 
2. The issuance of development rights; 
3. The responsibility for connection of offshore power plants to onshore transmission; 
4. The design of and approach to financial settlement. 
 
An overview of the conceptual options for each of the four components follows. 
 
Seabed tenure: scope of allocation 
Conceptually, models for allocating seabed tenure7 occupy a spectrum between two opposing 
extremes: 
 
1. An ‘open-door’ approach in which companies promoting an offshore wind project are 
indicate a site8 on which they propose to build an offshore wind farm for consideration by 
appropriate authorities; 
 
2. A ‘defined-site’ allocation in which the government or one of its agents identifies a site which 
is then allocated by the State to a company or companies exclusively for the construction of 
an offshore wind farm. 
                                                          
6 Or the rights to occupy the seabed  
7 Although ‘tenure’ might not strictly be issued to projects more the 12 nautical miles from a nation’s sea coast, where the 
bulk of offshore wind megaprojects are built, the rights to allow occupation of the seabed reside with the nation’s 
government under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 
8 With potential inappropriate sites and areas excluded in a process of Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
 
Between these two extremes is an approach in which state authorities offer an offshore wind ‘zone’ 
or zones to a company or companies for the construction of a single wind farm with a degree of 
freedom over the final location and detailed design. Such rights are often but not always provided in 
conjunction with “development rights” described below. 
Development rights: number of permits and stakeholders 
Obtaining permission to develop an offshore wind farm is generally more complex than for onshore 
renewables (Toke, 2011). Much of this complexity arises from the number of public agencies from 
which permits must be obtained or to which legal compliance must be demonstrated (Snyder & 
Kaiser, 2009). The other area of complexity is the requirement to consult with various statutory and 
other stakeholders as part of the conditions of many offshore permits (Gray et al., 2005). 
Consequently, there are two main ways in which this targeted reform may be implemented: i) by 
limiting the number of public agents from which permits must be obtained and ii) by simplifying or 
limiting the process of consultation.  
Grid connection: allocation of responsibility 
Meeus (2014) usefully identifies three distinct models for connecting offshore renewable energy 
projects to the grid: 
 
1. A ‘TSO model’ in which responsibility for extending the transmission grid to 
accommodate offshore connections is performed by the TSO but responsibility to 
connect to the offshore transmission system remains with the project owner; 
2. A ‘generator model’ in which responsibility to connect to the onshore system lies with 
the wind farm owner; and 
3. A ‘third party model’ in which a (regulated) third party is responsible for the connection 
between the generator and the TSO 
  
A fourth model may be added in which the transmission system is extended to accommodate 
offshore connections AND the connection from the wind farm to the offshore transmission system is 
handled by the TSO. We might call this the TSO+ model. 
Financial settlement: access, remuneration model and level 
Policy-makers have numerous design options available when selecting how to support renewable 
energy investment and there is a copious literature produced over the last two decades discussing 
the merits of and problems with a wide range of models (see Mitchell et al., 2006; del Río & Gual, 
2004; Fouquet & Johansson, 2008 etc.). From the perspective of a power generation project 
developer, there are three elements or answers to questions which define a complete financial 
settlement9.  These are access - how is the support accessed? Remuneration model10 - on what basis 
does the plant owner receive support? Deciding the level - how is the level of the remuneration 
determined? 
                                                          
9 Settlement defined here as the access to and structure of revenue from targeted policy intervention – 
including any support mechanism.  
10 As highlighted by Couture and Gagnon (2010) 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
 
Access to the settlement can be either automatic or constrained by budget or volume limits in some 
way. A financial settlement must specify the basis on which payments will be calculated (del Río & 
Gual, 2004; Fouquet & Johansson, 2008; Kitzing et al., 2012). The classifications used here are fixed 
payments per unit of production (eg fixed feed-in tariffs), sliding payments to meet a target price (eg 
a contract for difference) and wholesale+: a payment in addition to the wholesale revenue, either 
from a fixed premium or the sale of a certificate11 (eg UK Renewables Obligation). The level of the 
remuneration can be set administratively, through a specialist market in, for example, green 
certificates or by a process in which projects compete directly on the basis of cost to determine the 
level. 
 
Access Remuneration model Deciding the level 
Automatic Fixed Administratively set 
Constrained Sliding Specialist market 
 Wholesale+ Competitive process 
Table 2: Options for an offshore wind financial settlement 
Having outlined the key elements of marine resource planning and economic governance relevant to 
the development of offshore wind in the EU, the following section outlines the main characteristics 
of the sector in 5 countries, and how these have evolved over time. 
  
                                                          
11 The value of which is not a function of the wholesale electricity price  
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Offshore wind in five EU Member States 
UK 
At the end of 2014, the UK had over  4GW of operating offshore wind capacity, more than all other 
EU Member States combined (EWEA, 2015). 
 
The British Crown owns nearly all of the UK’s territorial waters seabed and a statutory corporation 
known as The Crown Estate holds the portfolio in trust. Outside the 12 Nautical Mile (nm) limit of the 
territorial waters, the Crown Estate has the rights to license the use of the seabed in the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ12), a region designated as a “Renewable Energy Zone” in an order of 200413. The 
Crown Estate (TCE) Corporation acts as seabed ‘landlord’ and seabed tenure is provided to offshore 
wind ‘tenants’ on a commercial basis14 (The Crown Estate, 2015b). Within areas deemed suitable by 
the UK’s Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) (HM Government, 2013), TCE has run four 
offshore wind leasing ‘rounds’ to date (The Crown Estate, 2014; Toke, 2011). 
  
The early leasing rounds in 2000 and 2003 were bilateral arrangements between TCE and a keen 
group of developers, with developers effectively proposing sites which TCE considered (The Crown 
Estate, 2015a). In a change of approach and informed by the UK’s ongoing Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA), Round 3 saw zones offered in 2009 to developers by TCE which are “designed to 
be large enough to give developers flexibility in the location of wind farms within them” (The Crown 
Estate, 2013). 
 
There are two principal permits required to build marine renewable electricity generating stations in 
the UK: permission from the Energy Secretary under Section 36 of the Electricity Act (1989) as 
amended by the 2004 Energy Act15 and a Marine License issued by the Marine Management 
Organisation (MMO) in England and Wales and Marine Scotland in Scotland. But, with the inclusion 
of large offshore wind projects (more than 100MW capacity) as ‘Nationally Significant Infrastructure 
Projects’ in the Planning Act (2008),16 application has been streamlined into the issuance of a single 
Development Consent Order (DCO) issued by the energy Secretary. Nevertheless, project developers 
are still required to conduct several consultations exercises to obtain a DCO (HM Government, 2015). 
 
Although early UK offshore wind farm grid connections were built, owned and operated by the wind 
farm owner, starting in 2009,17 the UK model for connecting offshore wind farms has been known as 
the Offshore Transmission Owner (OFTO) regime (Meeus, 2014; Green & Vasilakos, 2011). The OFTO 
regime sees the rights to ownership of each connection awarded to independent transmission 
owners through competitive tenders. The early tenders required that the generator offer the 
connection to auction on completion but the so-called ‘enduring regime’ allows for both ‘generator 
build’ and ‘OFTO build’ models (Ofgem, 2014). 
 
The decision to adopt a third-party model for offshore transmission was taken by the UK 
                                                          
12 As defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) 
13 (Electricity: The Renewable Energy Zone (Designation of Area) Order 2004) 
14 i.e. rent is paid 
15 UK Energy Act (2004) Pt 2 Chapter 2 
16 UK Planning Act (2008) s15(3)(b) 
17 With first connections in 2011 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Government in 2007 on the grounds that it would enable a more cost efficient offshore transmission 
system than an alternative, TSO-led model (DTI, 2007) with plans for the current competitive OFTO 
system overseen by the market regulator coming later (Ofgem, 2007).  
 
In common with all other large-scale renewable generation technologies, offshore wind in the UK has 
been provided revenue support through a financial mechanism known as the Renewables Obligation 
(RO). The RO is a variant of the tradable green certificate concept which has undergone significant 
changes to its function since implementation in 2002 but the basic premise that generators have 
access to a revenue stream in addition to those from electricity sales remains unchanged (Woodman 
& Mitchell, 2011). Access to the RO is gained by accreditation18 of a project by the market regulator 
and all projects which meet the technical requirement of accreditation have access to the system 
(Ofgem, 2015).  
 
The main financial support system for large-scale renewables in the UK is in transition from the RO to 
a new mechanism known as Contracts for Difference (CfD) introduced under the UK Government’s 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR) programme. A CfD is a contract with a Government owned 
counterparty which guarantees the holder (generator) payments calculated as the difference 
between the agreed support level (strike price) and an index of the wholesale market price 
(reference price) for a fixed period, 15 years in the case of offshore wind.  
 
Although the intention was to allocate CfD contracts competitively, the first offshore wind CfDs19 
were awarded in 2014 to 5 projects with the strike price set administratively to maintain momentum 
in the pipeline of projects in the period of transition from the RO (DECC, 2014). The transition to 
competitive allocation of CfDs was completed in February 2015 with two offshore wind projects 
winning contracts to start operation between 2017 and 2019 in multi-technology auctions 
administered by the TSO of Great Britain, National Grid Plc (DECC, 2015). 
 
                                                          
18 This new policy approach is considered an innovation although the UK does have previous experience of competitive 
allocation of renewables support through the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) orders of the 1990s (Mitchell, 1995). 
19 Also known as Final Investment Decision Enabling (FIDe) contracts 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Germany 
Following a relatively slow start to offshore wind development, Germany had more than 1GW of 
installed capacity at the end of 2014 with the rate of installation increasing significantly in 2014 and 
2015 (EWEA, 2015).  
While all issues of land tenure (and permitting) in the territorial waters of Germany are the 
responsibility of the State governments (Länder), offshore wind activity in the EEZ is overseen by the 
federal authorities. Prompted in part by the need to manage the social and environmental impact of 
claims on the sea by existing and new users (offshore wind in particular), in 2005, Germany’s Federal 
Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) began work on a Marine Spatial Plan (MSP) for the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Coming into effect in 2009, the MSP clearly identifies, priority areas 
for offshore wind development (BSH, 2009, p.19).  
 
Nevertheless, offshore wind developers are entitled, under the Marine Facilities Ordinance, 1997 
(Seeanlagenverordnung, SeeAnIV20) (Article 5), to submit plans for wind farms in other areas of the 
EEZ. The BSH takes sole responsibility, under the Marine Facilities Ordinance21 and in in consultation 
with other competent authorities, for the permitting of offshore wind farms to proceed. A plan may 
only be approved if it does not impair the safety and efficiency of navigation or the safety of national 
or allied defence, is not detrimental to the marine environment and complies with all other 
requirements of the public law. 
 
Although grid connection was originally the responsibility of the developer of offshore wind projects, 
an Act was passed in 2006 compelling the relevant TSOs to provide grid connection to offshore 
projects (Markard & Petersen, 2009). Connection to the transmission grid is provided by the relevant 
transmission owner and TSO22 which are obliged under the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) or 
renewable energy law as amended in 2014 to provide connections at a rate of up to 800MW per year 
up to 6.5GW in 2020 (Lang, 2014).     
 
 
Germany has had a feed-in system for a range of renewables in place since 1991, originally 
structured as a supplement to the wholesale power price and replaced by the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG) in 2000 which guaranteed a fixed price per unit of 
production for a fixed period of time (Mitchell et al., 2006) and extended the support to include 
offshore wind (EEG, 2000). In 201223 the EEG law made provision for ‘direct marketing’ of electricity 
from renewable sources which enabled a generator to sell directly into wholesale power markets and 
receive ‘market premium’24 calculated as the difference between a measure of the average monthly 
power price and the relevant tariff (annex 4, EEG, 2012). In the 2012 iteration of the law a generator 
could switch between the tariff and direct marketing on a monthly basis. However, the 2014 EEG 
introduced ‘compulsory direct marketing’25 which strictly limits the circumstances under which a 
                                                          
20 (Ordinance on Offshore Installations Seaward of the Limit of the German Territorial Sea (Offshore Installations 
Ordinance)) 
21 Art. 5, para. 1.4 
22 The coastal regions of Germany are covered by two TSOs, TenneT (owned by the Dutch government) in the North Sea and 
Elia (partly owned by the Belgian government) in the Baltic Sea. 
23 Chapter 2. Germany. Act on granting priority to renewable energy sources (Renewable Energy Sources Act – EEG). (2012). 
24 Generators also receive a small supplement to compensate for the cost and risk of direct power market participation 
25 For all generators with a capacity of over 500kW 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
generator qualifies for the fixed tariff, effectively mandating the direct marketing option. 
 
While the tariff (or target under direct marketing) for EEG generators has long been calculated on the 
basis of energy cost estimates26, the compliance with the state-aid guidelines issued by the European 
Commission in March 2014 (European Commission, 2014) mean that Member States must 
implement competitive allocation of financial support by 2017. The relevant German authorities are 
in the process of developing a renewables auctions system. 
 
                                                          
26 And structured to include features such as digression to promote innovation and allow for cost reduction 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands currently has two operational offshore wind farms installed in 2006 and 2008 with a 
combined capacity of 228MW  and a legislative act is currently in progress which aims to significantly 
reform the country’s approach to offshore wind (RVO, 2015). 
 
Spatial Planning in Dutch waters is currently directed by the National Water Plan (NWP) under the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (MIE)27 under the Water Management Act (Wet Beheer 
Rijkswaterstaatswerken, WBR. While in theory the WBR opens up the entire EEZ of the Netherlands 
to the permitting of wind farms, the available sites were restricted to two areas28 by the NWP 
(Government of the Netherlands, 2009). Land tenure and permission to build were combined in a 
single consent issued and coordinated by National Water Department for the North Sea 
(Rijkswaterstaat Noordzee) with significant responsibility on the developer to pursue the appropriate 
consultations and carry out surveys. 
 
In September 2014 the Government of the Netherlands announced plans to reform their approach to 
offshore wind in order to promote rapid expansion of the installed capacity of the offshore wind fleet 
in the Dutch North Sea (RVO, 2015; Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment & Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2014). 
 
In 2015 legislation is expected to pass29 which significantly alters the approach to seabed tenure and 
development rights. Tenure will be allocated on the basis of specified wind farm sites located in 
three designated offshore wind areas.30 The sites tightly define the wind farm, including location, 
cable routes and the results of social and environmental surveys sufficient to meet all legal 
requirements carried out by the Government (RVO, 2015; Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment & Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2014; Loyens Loeff, 2015).  
 
The Dutch TSO, TenneT, has been handed responsibility for building and operating an offshore wind 
grid with three points of connection to which offshore wind farms can connect. The changes will be 
implemented by amendments to the 1998 Electricity and Gas Act with TenneT legally able to take 
action from 2016 (Loyens Loeff, 2015).  
 
Since 2008, the Netherlands has supported renewable energy via its Stimulering Duurzame 
Energieproductie (SDE – Stimulation of Sustainable Energy Production) program which included a 
specific offshore wind tariff allocated by a competitive tender in 2009. Relaunched in 2011 as SDE+, 
revenues from the policy are structured as a sliding premium tariff in which a generator is provided a 
level of support per unit production which is calculated as the difference between the target support 
level and a measure of the wholesale power price (RVO, 2014; Jansen et al., 2011) 
 
Under the new road map, licences will be revoked for offshore wind projects which were awarded 
seabed tenure under a tender in 2009 and seabed tenure, licences to build, grid connection and 
financial settlement will be awarded to the winner(s) of a competitive bidding process. 
 
                                                          
27 With the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
28 Hollandse Kust (‘Dutch Shore’) and ‘Ten noorden 
van de Waddeneilanden’ (‘North of the Wadden Islands’). 
29 Offshore wind act submitted to parliament October 16, 2014 
30 Borssele, Hollandse Kust Zuid-Holland and Hollandse Kust Noord-Holland 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Denmark 
Denmark has often been cited as a leader in the deployment of wind energy technology, both 
onshore and offshore. Denmark had five large (>100MW), commercial wind farms in operation at the 
end of 2014 which accounted for nearly 90% of the 1,270MW of operational capacity in the country 
(EWEA, 2015) . 
 
The primary approach for Denmark’s offshore wind expansion is calls for tender to build large-scale, 
commercial wind farms on pre-determined sites. Tenders have been central to the Danish approach 
to offshore wind since the first call in 2003 (Munksgaard & Morthorst, 2008; Meyer, 2007). 
 
Tenders are for sites identified through Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) offered as a package of seabed 
rights, electricity generation licensing and grid connection which the Government takes on the risk 
and costs of establishing.  Applications for these concessions are assessed on social and 
environmental factors before participating in an auction in which the project with the lowest cost of 
energy wins. 
 
The development and deployment of offshore wind in Denmark is overseen by the Danish Energy 
Agency (DEA) which acts as a single point of contact for nearly all consenting, permitting and 
licensing activity including the issuance of seabed tenure. The DEA is part of the Danish Ministry of 
Climate, Energy and Building. Seabed tenure, all required permits along with relevant electricity 
generation and export licenses are issued by the DEA, under a so-called “one-stop-shop” approach. 
As part of the process of permitting a project, the DEA coordinates communication for necessary 
consultations between the developer and the various private and stakeholders and governmental 
bodies (DEA, 2015a, 2014; Government of Denmark, 2008). 
 
Although Danish Electricity Supply Act entitles prospective offshore wind developers to approach the 
land-tenure and development rights through an “open door” approach, the financial settlement 
available to unsolicited offshore projects is the same as that which is available to new onshore 
projects and therefore unlikely to be adequate to enable commercial investment in megaproject 
scale offshore wind31. 
 
The final price per unit of output is provided to the winner by the national TSO as a fixed settlement 
price in the form of a contract for difference for a fixed amount of output , an approach that has 
been used since 2005 (Kitzing et al., 2012; IEA, 2015c). In all cases, the state owned Transmission 
System Operator (TSO), Energinet.dk provides and maintains grid connections as well as taking 
responsibility for planning and investment in the grid more generally, with this activity overseen by 
the DEA. 
  
  
 
                                                          
31 Although not inconceivable – a number of projects are in the early stages of progressing through the open-door system 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Belgium 
Belgium has been actively pursuing offshore wind since 200432 with three large-scale, commercial 
projects with a combined capacity of over 700MW operating by the end of 2014 (EWEA, 2015) 
 
In 200433, Belgium designated seven offshore wind zones34, all have which have now been allocated 
to developers (Loyens Loeff, 2014; Brabant & S. Degraer & B. Rumes, 2011). The Federal Public 
Service (FPS) for Economy 35reviews prospective wind farm owners’ application for rights to occupy 
the seabed in the Belgian EEZ and advises the Energy Minister who will take a decision.  
 
In order to build and operate an offshore wind farm in Belgian waters an Environmental Licence  is 
required from the Minister responsible for the marine environment based on the advice of the  
Management Unit of the North Sea Mathematical Models under a process which was substantially 
simplified in 200336 (MUMM)(MUMM, 2010). 
 
All offshore wind project in Belgium to-date have been responsible for their own grid connection, 
albeit with up to one-third37 of the capital cost borne by the TSO, Elia (CREG, 2014; Loyens Loeff, 
2014). In 2013 plans were announced to begin the so-called Belgian Offshore Grid (BOG), a TSO 
funded initiative to provide ‘socket-at-sea’ connections to future offshore wind farms (CREG, 2014; 
Elia, 2015, 2013). Completion of the project was originally expected to occur by 2018 and works to 
strengthen the onshore grid began in spring 2015. 
 
Regions of Belgium began implementing TGC policies in 2002 (Verbruggen, 2004) with the legal basis 
for offshore wind projects to sell certificates at a guaranteed minimum price in place from 2003 
(Loyens Loeff, 2014; IEA, 2015b; 3E, 2013). The minimum price effectively structures the 
remuneration as a fixed premium to the project’s wholesale revenues.  
 
For projects reaching financial close after May 1, 2014 the revenue structure has changed. The new 
system calculates the minimum certificate price as the difference between an average of the 
wholesale market price38 and the target minimum price39 set by Royal decree40. In common with all 
other EU Members, Belgium can be expected to begin competitive allocation of offshore wind 
support by 2017 as required by the European Commission’s state-aid guidelines of 2014. 
  
 
                                                          
32 With the first project completed in 2010 
33 Although the first concession was let in 2003 (Brabant & S. Degraer & B. Rumes, 2011) 
34 Amended in 2008: http://www.mumm.ac.be/Downloads/MBBS301008pp57503-57505.pdf 
35 Having recently taken over this role from the Belgian Federal Electricity and Gas Regulator (CREG) 
36 Federal Government of Belgium. Royal Decree establishing procedures for granting permits and authorizations required 
for certain activities in marine areas under Belgian jurisdiction. (2003). 
http://www.mumm.ac.be/Downloads/MBBS170903pp46101-46111.pdf 
37 Up to €25m 
38 90% of the price at the APX electricity exchange 
39 Initially €138 
40 (Royal Decree of 4th April 2014 amending the Royal Decree of 16 July 2002 on the establishment of mechanisms for the 
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources). 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
 Summary and results 
Seabed tenure 
Despite open door approaches to seabed tenure having been the starting point in most cases, almost 
all countries have altered the way it is allocated to offshore wind projects in some way with defined-
sites or zones allocated in nearly all cases . Only Germany continues to allocate offshore wind seabed 
tenure on an open-door basis. 
 
 Open door Zoned Tender Single site tender 
UK 2000-2009 2009-  
DE 1997-   
DK 1991-2004  2004- 
BE  2004-  
NL 2001-2015  2015- 
Table 3: Summary of approaches to seabed tenure 
Development rights 
Nearly all countries examined have implemented reforms that reduce the number of contacts 
between developers and public agencies or the amount of consultation by developers with the aim 
of improving the performance of streamlining the licencing and permitting system for offshore wind 
projects.  
 Targeted reform 
UK 2008- 
DE 1997 
DK 2004 
BE 2004 
NL 2015 
Table 4: Summary of approaches to development rights41 
Grid connection 
Other than the UK which has a unique third-party model, all countries have moved to – or are in the 
process of moving to - TSO (or TSO+) model for connecting offshore wind farms to onshore 
transmission systems. 
 Developer model Third Party model TSO model TSO+ model 
UK 2000-2007 2007-   
DE   2006-  
DK    2004- 
BE 2004-  2018  
NL 2006-  2016  
Table 5: Summary of approaches to grid connection 
                                                          
41 Expected or upcoming changes in italics 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Financial settlement  
Allocation 
Some form of constrained allocation of support for offshore wind has been implemented in most of 
the cases in the last decade or so. Although Germany and Belgium have not formally begun 
implementation of a constrained allocation system, the European Commissions’ State Aid guidelines 
of 2014 clearly imply that such a system should be in place by 2017. Indeed, Germany is known to be 
currently developing a system. 
 Automatic Constrained 
UK 2002-2015 2015 
DE … 2017 
DK  2003 
BE … 2017 
NL  2009 
Table 6: Summary of approaches to financial settlement allocation 
Structuring 
The support available to offshore wind has taken many forms in Europe. However, since 2008 all of 
the Member State cases have implemented some form of sliding premium mechanism for 
remunerating offshore wind generation.  
 Fixed Sliding 
premium 
Wholesale + 
UK  2014- 2002-2014 
DE 2000-2014 2014- 1991-2000 
DK 1993-1999 2005- 1999-2005 
BE 2002-2015 2015-  
NL  2008-  
Table 7: Summary of approaches to financial settlement structure 
Setting the level 
The means by which the level of remuneration of offshore wind generation is set in most cases is 
some kind of competitive process. Although Belgium and Germany have not yet implemented policy 
which would allow for this kind of approach, the European Commission’s state aid guidelines can be 
expected to precipitate the implementation of competitive price setting by 2017. 
 
 Administrative proces  Certificate marke  Competitive proces  
UK 2014-2015 2002-2014 2015- 
DE 2000-  2017 
DK 1993-2003  2003 
BE 2002-  2017 
NL   2009- 
Table 8: Summary of approaches to setting the level of the financial settlement 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
Discussion 
These findings clearly show that all four of the elements of offshore wind governance explored here 
show significant convergence upon a model based on: 
 
1. designated-site or zoned land tenure model; 
2. targeted reform of how development rights are issued (generally in the form of more 
centralised authority) ; 
3. TSO-led, built or funded grid connection; and 
4. constrained allocation of sliding premium revenue support. 
 
There has been significant policy innovation leading to convergence of the governance models for 
offshore wind in the five cases chosen. The innovation is characterised the participation of EU, 
national and subnational actors. Questions are raised about how and why it has occurred. In very 
general terms, changes to policy might be explained one of two ways:  by reference to ‘internal 
determinants’ or political, economic and social factors within a policymaking environment or 
‘diffusion’ models which see policy approaches and ideas spreading between environments across 
social channels (Berry & Berry, 1990, 2007). While it is not possible to state categorically that the 
convergence of policy approaches is entirely due to one or the other (indeed it is likely to be a 
combination of both), there is some evidence suggesting that policy diffusion between Member 
States is at least partly responsible for the convergence42.  
We might expect policy diffusion within the EU, the very existence of which is an attempt at policy 
harmonisation between countries (Padgett, 2003; Bomberg & Peterson, 2000; Radaelli, 2000). But in 
this instance it is not clear where policy innovation or change has been preceded by an active 
decision by the EU to harmonise a policy element. The European Commission guidelines on State Aid 
clearly require that instruments such as “auctioning or competitive bidding process(es)” are used 
(European Commission, 2014a, p.24) . The guidelines undoubtedly have significant implications for 
the future financial settlement for renewables across the European Economic Area (EEA) but this 
explanation does nothing to account for the fact that countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, 
France and possibly the UK began implementing policies to reform the way in which financial 
settlements for offshore wind were allocated and a the level set more than a decade before the EU’s 
guidelines were published. One could hypothesise that one or more of these earlier innovators 
successfully ‘uploaded’ their policy preferences to the EU level which were subsequently 
‘downloaded’ to the other Member States (Padgett, 2003). More research could discover the nature 
and extent of influence.  
Another area of economic governance in which the EU plays a significant coordination role is the 
regulation of electricity networks. There has been innovation in the way offshore wind farms are 
connected to the onshore transmission system in all five cases with ‘generator model’ connection 
abandoned in favour of two alternative models. While the EU’s electricity liberalisation packages may 
                                                          
42 For example, the existence of networking events explicitly designed for the European offshore wind 
policymaking community to meet and share experiences and know-how, led by the Government of Denmark 
(DEA, 2015b) 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
play a role in defining national approaches to offshore grid approaches generally (European 
Commission, 2008), an interpretation of the unbundling requirements that negates the generator 
model is not universally accepted43 (SKM, 2012). Instead, the cost and returns to scale for offshore 
wind grid connections which can account for up to 20% of a project’s capital expense create a 
powerful functional argument at the Member State level for TSO and TSO+ models (European 
Commission, 2008; BVG, 2010) with the UK’s third-party approach the only outlier. 
Similar economic, institutional or legal arrangements44 do not appear to predict the closeness or 
otherwise of two Member States’ offshore wind governance especially well. The UK as the most 
classically liberal market economy (LME) in the group (Hall & Soskice, 2001a) is not an outlier in its 
financial settlement, innovating to put market governance (i.e. auctions of sliding tariffs) at the heart 
of its approach to offshore wind well after Denmark and the Netherlands, both of which better fit the 
description of coordinated market economy (CME). The UK’s unique third party approach to grid 
connection might, however, better suit the expectation of an LME. Explanations based on peer-to 
peer interaction and learning between national policymakers are likely more promising. 
 There is remarkable variety in the legal and institutional basis for issuing offshore wind development 
rights. The ‘maze’ (Wright, 2014) of organisations and laws that must be negotiated was, until 
recently almost entirely different in each of the six countries. Some relied on legislation aimed at the 
electricity sector, others on nature conservation law, some on both. The complexity of the permitting 
process for offshore wind projects has long been suspected as one of the important distinctions 
between a well-functioning offshore wind governance framework and one that slows and limits 
investment (e.g. EWEA, 2010). Despite the variety of starting points, all six countries have looked to 
greater centralisation of decision making authority and/or reducing the number of stakeholder voices 
with access to the process.  
Innovation in offshore wind seabed tenure has tended to be in the form of reducing the breadth of 
options open to potential developers with countries apparently emulating one or the other of two 
leading offshore wind nations, the UK and Denmark. The approaches adopted appear to be largely 
independent of the legal and institutional basis on which seabed tenure is let. For example, the UK 
with its landlord approach for seabed tenure has developed a zoned-tenure model - as has Belgium, 
a federal state with no parallel institution to The Crown Estate.  
The EU-supported move to auctions as the primary means of allocating and setting the level of 
support for offshore wind is likely to have secondary effects including greater centralisation of 
offshore wind governance. The timing and sequencing of the planning process has been shown to be 
of greater importance for the smooth functioning of auction systems than for other support policies 
(del Río & Linares, 2014). The implication is that auction processes demand greater coordination 
between seabed tenure, the development rights process, grid connection and financial settlement. A 
reasonable expectation might be that greater coordination precipitates an increased role for central 
government agencies to manage the interactions. While Denmark and the Netherlands have 
                                                          
43 Sweden, for instance, maintains a ‘generator’ model for connecting offshore wind farms  
44 Often described as isomorphism (Radaelli, 2000) 
                       
 
 
 
                
   
 
implemented or announced45 a fully integrated auction system with all four elements managed 
within a single process, the other countries have only recently implemented an auction system or will 
do in the next two years.  
Conclusion 
Offshore wind energy governance frameworks in Europe are converging on a common model with 
the EU so far playing a limited role in the process and ‘peer-to-peer’ diffusion a more important 
factor. However, universal implementation auctioning of offshore wind financial settlements may 
increase the incentives on policy-makers to further centralise decision making about offshore wind in 
order to enable effective auctions to take place. This centralisation, combined with the megaproject 
scale of offshore wind projects puts it at odds with much of the discourse about the role of scale and 
decentralisation in the transition to a low-carbon energy system (Wiersma & Devine-Wright, 2014). 
For this reason alone the political and social dimensions of offshore wind are deserving of much 
greater attention.  
Also, at a time when there is a concerted effort within the EU institutions to create a European 
‘Energy Union’ as a powerful integrative force (Buzek, 2015),  exploring and understanding the 
mechanisms by energy policy innovations diffuse within in the EU is a potentially important area for 
further research. 
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